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1:  Introduction 
One very popular framework in contemporary epistemology is Bayesian. The central epistemic 
state is subjective confidence, or credence. Traditional epistemic states like belief and knowledge 
tend to be sidelined, or even dispensed with entirely. (In an attempt to sugar the pill, credences 
are often called degrees of belief.) Instead of believing or knowing that Jones will get the job, the 
target phenomenon is having a certain credence that Jones will get the job. Given this 
framework, the overarching question is: what credences are the “rational” ones to have?  
 Credences are often introduced as familiar mental states, merely in need of a special label for 
the purposes of epistemology. But whether they are implicitly recognized by the folk or posits of 
a sophisticated scientific psychology, they do not appear to fit well with perception, as is often 
noted: 
A central tenet of the Bayesian program is the representation of beliefs by distributions, 
which assign probability to each of a set of hypotheses. The prominent theoretical status 
accorded to such ambiguity seems rather puzzlingly at odds with the all-or-nothing nature 
of our everyday perceptual lives. For instance, subjects observing ambiguous or rivalrous 
visual displays famously report experiencing either percept alternately and exclusively; 
for even the most fervent Bayesian, it seems impossible simultaneously to interpret the 
Necker cube as potentially facing either direction. (Daw and Courville 2007: 1528)  
This paper investigates the tension between probabilistic cognition and non-probabilistic 
perception. The tension is real, and the solution—to adapt a phrase from Quine and Goodman—
is to renounce credences altogether. 
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2:  Belief and credence 
Start with belief—also known as full belief or outright belief.1 For the purposes of this paper, we 
can adopt the simple view that believing p is a relational state of people and other animals: to 
believe p is to stand in the believing relation to the proposition p (cf. Stalnaker 1988: 150). 
 When one believes p one treats p as settled, and so is inclined to rely on p as a premise or 
assumption. One’s inclination might be more or less strong (as a glass might be more or less 
fragile), which seems to correspond to the strength of belief: one believes p more strongly, the 
greater one’s inclination to rely on p in reasoning (Williamson 2000: 99).  
 Beliefs may be more or less strong or firm, but it would be a mistake to conclude from this 
that beliefs come in degrees, as Moon points out (2017: 767-68). (Mattresses may be more or 
less firm, but they do not come in degrees.)2 More importantly, to believe p more or less strongly 
is to believe it. If I know that a coin biased .6 in favor of heads is about to be tossed, I do not 
believe that it will land heads; a fortiori I do not believe that it will land heads “less strongly” 
than I believe that it will land either heads or tails.3 
 In the case of the coin, I neither believe that it will land heads or that it will not land heads. I 
do believe that the probability of the coin landing heads is .6, but (on the face of it) this is 
nothing special—it is just a belief like any other. I may hold it more or less strongly, and for 
good or bad reasons. If in fact the coin is fair then my belief is false. Admittedly, it is not entirely 
clear what the relevant notion of probability is, but it is usually easy enough to apply in practice.  
 According to many philosophers, I may also have a certain credence in the proposition that 
the coin will land heads, intuitively thought of as the “amount of confidence” or “level of 
 
1 For the reasons given in Hawthorne et al. 2016, ‘belief’ may have another weaker interpretation in certain context. 
The stronger “fully believe” interpretation is in force here (see Williamson forthcoming). 
2 Thus the terminology of ‘degrees of belief’ (an early occurrence of which is in Ramsey 1926) is not especially apt 
for belief; for credence, it is not apt at all. 
3 ‘Strongly/firmly believe’ is unexceptionable, unlike ‘weakly believe’. Thomas Jefferson wrote to Samuel 
Kercheval Monticello that we should not “weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking 
care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs”; Holton (2014: n. 13, 34-5) notes that Jefferson’s ‘weakly believe’ is 
vanishingly rare. ‘Partly believe’ is more familiar. (It appears in the King James Bible: “For first of all, when ye 
come together in the church, I hear that there be divisions among you; and I partly believe it”, 1 Corinthians 11:18.) 
But ‘partly’ does not seem to indicate the strength of belief: the most straightforward interpretation of ‘I partly 
believe the reports’ is ‘I believe (only) some parts of the reports’. 
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confidence” that I place in that proposition.4 The amount of confidence (Cr) is usually scaled 
from 0 to 1 and—at least in the ideally rational agent—is taken to obey the Kolmogorov axioms 
of probability. Thus Cr(p) = 1 when p is a logical truth, and Cr(p v q) = Cr(p) + Cr(q) when p 
and q are incompatible. So in addition to my belief that the probability of the coin landing heads 
is .6, I may have credence (or “subjective probability”) .6 in the proposition that the coin will 
land heads. If Oberon has credence .6 in p and Titania has .5 credence in p, they bear different 
attitudes—different determinates of the same determinable—to the same proposition.5,6 
 It is generally agreed that our credences fall short of the ideal, perhaps by some considerable 
margin. Although some of our credences are precise (e.g. those pertaining to coin flips), some of 
our credences may be “imprecise”, as well as not defined on numerous propositions.7 And they 
are sometimes probabilistically inconsistent when defined—to take a famous example, a person’s 
credence that Linda is a bank teller might be lower than his credence that she is a feminist bank 
teller (Tversky and Kahneman 1983). But the enterprise of studying the constraints governing the 
credences of an ideally rational agent would hardly be central to epistemology—and perhaps not 
even intelligible—unless imperfect agents like ourselves had credences too (cf. Holton 2014: 
15).8   
 
4 E.g. Joyce 2010: 431. 
5 Thus on the view that replaces probabilistically graded doxastic attitudes with beliefs in propositions about 
probability, there are no credences (here following Hájek and Lin 2017: 210 and Staffel 2013: 3537, not Dogramaci 
2018: 10 or Leitgeb 2017: 20). 
6 This understanding of credence (and, indeed, the very first paragraph of this section) departs from the ambitious 
have-your-cake-and-eat-it account of credence and knowledge in Moss 2018. Moss argues that the contents of belief 
are not propositions, but rather “probabilistic contents”, namely “sets of probability spaces” (4), which assign 
probabilities to possibilities. An ordinary full belief in p has a “nominally probabilistic content”, which only assigns 
probability to possibilities in which p is true; for her credences are beliefs with “thoroughly probabilistic contents” 
(14), where the probability spaces are of the more usual kind. Thus, according to Moss, if Oberon has .6 credence in 
p, the content of his belief is a set of probability spaces all of which assign .6 to p. (Hence if Oberon fully believes p 
then his credence in p is 1, although Moss rejects the converse.) She also expresses much sympathy with the view 
that perception has probabilistic content (89-99). Moss’s account is highly relevant to the topic of this paper, but is 
unexamined here for reasons of space. 
7 See, e.g., White 2010, Schoenfield 2012. 
8 See also Hájek and Lin 2017. 
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 Although belief and credence appear to be quite different, appearances can be misleading: 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that appear different, but arguably the former is a species of the 
latter (Stanley and Williamson 2001). Could belief be a species of credence? Equating believing 
p with having credence 1 in p sets the bar for belief too high, since credence 1 is supposed to 
correspond to maximal certainty, admitting of no further gradations.9 But equating believing p 
with having credence > x (the “Lockean view”) is also problematic, because—it is generally 
agreed—rational belief agglomerates: if one rationally believes p and believes q one may 
rationally believe p&q. But rational credence > x does not: if one has rational credence > x in p 
and rational credence > x in q, the rational credence to have in p&q might be < x. (See, e.g., 
Holton 2008: 34; Sturgeon 2008.) A reduction in the other direction, of credence to belief, seems 
hopeless from the start: as was pointed out, to have credence .6 in p is not to believe anything. 
Here we will make the widely (although not universally) accepted assumption that appearances 
are not misleading: beliefs do not tag along for free once credences are in place.10 
 Granted that neither credence nor belief can be reduced to the other, there is an immediate 
problem, which Weisberg (2020: 2) calls the dualist dilemma. Credences are supposed to be 
information-encoding action-guiding states: Titania opened the fridge because she had high 
credence that it contained beer. But belief and knowledge are supposed to be information-
encoding action-guiding states too: Titania opened the fridge because she believed (or knew) it 
contained beer. Since neither explanation requires the other, we appear to have pointless 
redundancy. Perhaps worse, we might have conflicting norms. Suppose that opening the fridge 
would maximize Titania’s expected utility, but she doesn’t know that it contains beer. According 
to the recommendations of decision theory, she should open the fridge; according to the maxim 
‘Act only on what you know’ (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008), she shouldn’t.11   
 
9 It also appears to set the bar too low, since having credence 1 that a ticket in an infinite lottery will lose is not to be 
wrong if it wins (see Williamson forthcoming; cf. Moss 2018: 56). For defenses of belief = credence 1 see Clarke 
2013 and Greco 2015; Wedgwood 2012 argues for a more complicated kind of reduction. 
10 See also Sturgeon 2008, Sturgeon 2015, Dietrich and List 2021.  
11 Weisberg’s version of the “dilemma”, unlike the one in the text, makes the terminology appropriate: either beliefs 
and credences “dictate the same inferences, actions, and assertions…or they do not” (2020: 2). He also notes the 
parsimony problem: “How are full and partial beliefs stored and maintained without duplicating cognitive burdens 
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 Despite this tension, many theorists (Weisberg included) are dualists: we have both 
credences and beliefs. Weisberg himself tries to resolve the dilemma by arguing (in part) that 
although we “simultaneously have full and partial beliefs [i.e. credences] about one and the same 
propositions dispositionally…only one of these dispositional states will be active at any given 
moment” (2020: 21-2). 
  Historically, credence monism was more favored by Bayesians. We have credences, and 
either don’t have beliefs or else the folk notion of belief is too confused to bear much theoretical 
weight. As Jeffrey puts in in an often-quoted remark: “our ordinary notion of belief is only 
vestigially present in the notion of degree of belief. I am inclined to think Ramsey sucked the 
marrow out of the ordinary notion and used it to nourish a more adequate view.’ (1970: 171–
172).12 Since there is little motivation to sweep away belief while sparing knowledge (and 
obviously impossible if knowledge entails belief), credence monism is extremely revisionary. 
Learning has to go too, since that involves the acquisition of knowledge, although in practice 
Bayesians like Jeffrey treat it as unproblematic. 
 That leaves belief monism, the thesis of this paper: “there are no such things as credences” 
(Holton 2014: 20). Belief monism is not widely defended, although it has some prominent 
adherents.13  
 Two final assumptions. First, credences are not reducible to dispositions to bet, or any other 
uncontroversial items.14 Second, we know and believe various things. The contest is between 
dualism and belief monism.15 
 
like storage and maintenance?” (3). (For related discussion see Staffel 2013, Buchak 2014, Hájek and Lin 2017, 
Jackson 2019.) 
12  See also Jeffrey 1992: 1-2, Maher 1993: 130. A nice summary of Jeffrey’s view is in Leitgeb 2017: 19. 
13 For varying degrees of sympathy, see Harman 1986, Easwaran 2016, Horgan 2017, Dogramaci 2018, 
Mandelbaum 2018 and Williamson forthcoming. 
14 The classic reduction to betting prices is in de Finetti 2017: 64. For some convincing arguments in favor of non-
reducibility, see Eriksson and Hájek 2007. 
15 Disparaging belief and knowledge as outdated relics of folk psychology would be more convincing if scientists 
didn’t traffic heavily in them (for helpful discussion see Nagel 2013). 
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3:  Perception as a propositional attitude 
So far we have discussed two familiar propositional attitudes: belief and credence. They are at 
least somewhat similar, which is why reductive programs are worth pursuing. We now need to 
introduce a third belief-like propositional attitude. 
 Philosophers of perception frequently invoke tomatoes and J. L. Austin’s piece of soap that 
looks just like a lemon, so imagine seeing a tomato and soap bar on a tabletop, in good light. 
(The soap is a white bar of Ivory, not a lemon lookalike.) You are not just visually presented 
with this (the red tomato) and that (the white soap), but with the fact that this is red and ovoid 
and that that is white and cuboid, and that this is to the left of that. In a situation of this kind, in 
which you have no reason to think anything amiss, you will believe (and, moreover, know) that a 
red ovoid is next to a white cuboid. And if you are familiar with basic household items, you will 
believe (and know) this red tomato is next to that white bar of soap. Here is McDowell making 
essentially the same point: 
In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in is that things are 
thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also 
be the content of a judgement: it becomes the content of a judgement if the subject 
decides to take the experience at face value. (McDowell 1994: 26)16 
Vision is in the business of delivering information (“that things are thus and so”) about the 
perceiver’s environment, information that specialized subsystems glean from the environment’s 
interaction with light. Treated with appropriate caution, Thomas Reid’s metaphor is useful here: 
information (or misinformation) delivered by perception is the testimony of the senses. Vision is 
testifying that this is red and ovoid and that that is white and cuboid—and of course it is 
testifying to much else besides. Put in contemporary jargon, the testimony of the senses is the 
“content of perception”.  
 It is a short step from this to the introduction of a third propositional attitude, exing. (‘Exing’ 
is meant to suggest ‘experiencing’, although it should not be taken to be equivalent to any 
ordinary English expression.) When one “takes in that things are thus and so”, one exes that 
things are thus and so. If one’s senses testify to p (in the intended interpretation of Reid’s 
metaphor), one exes p. If one exes p and the operative sense is vision, then we can think of vision 
 
16 McDowell later amended his view, but not in ways relevant to this paper (McDowell 2008).  
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scientists as trying to explain how the visual system derives p from retinal stimulation, “how to 
get from optical images of scenes back to knowledge of the objects that gave rise to them” 
(Palmer 1999: 23).17 
 All this granted, there must be a point at which exing falls silent and judging and believing 
take over. If I see the bar and soap and immediately form the belief that Titania has been 
shopping, I am not simply taking “the experience at face value”. I did not ex that Titania has 
been shopping because I didn’t even see Titania, and anyway having been shopping has no 
characteristic visual signature. My belief, rather, is the result of some kind of inference from 
propositions I did ex. If Titania has not been shopping and I claim that my senses were deceiving 
me, then, in Reid’s words, this “lays the blame where it ought not to be laid” (quoted in Van 
Cleve 2015: 139). There was nothing wrong with the testimony of perception, the fault is in what 
I did with it. 
 A trickier case is my belief that this red tomato is next to that white bar of soap. Is vision 
testifying to the presence of a tomato, and soap, as such? There is near-universal agreement that 
“low-level” features like color, texture, shape, motion and so on are part of the deliverances of 
vision, but whether the list extends to botanical or artifact kinds is disputed (see, e.g., Siegel and 
Byrne 2016). For present purposes this dispute won’t matter; for convenience we will assume the 
“rich view”, on which one can ex that this tomato is next to that bar of soap.  
4:  Exing and perceptual epistemology 
An epistemically rational person is not simply a coherent one, or so we may fairly assume. To 
believe a consistent fairy tale is not to believe as one should. Similarly with having credences 
that confirm to the probability calculus: “subjective Bayesianism” is not the correct theory of 
rationality.18 Further constraints come from the world itself, and in particular from perception. 
 
17 Information from the various senses is pooled (this is particularly clear for smell and taste), hence a single attitude 
of exing is arguably all that is needed; a single attitude is useful but not crucial for the purposes of this paper. Exing 
appears in Morrison 2016 as “perceptually entertaining” (37). There are plenty of exing sympathizers; some recent 
ones include Siegel 2010, 2017, Speaks 2015, Schellenberg 2018, Brogaard 2018. Other views of perception are 
even less hospitable to the credence picture. See, e.g., Campbell 2002, Travis 2004, Martin 2004, Brewer 2006, 
Johnston 2006. Some views hostile to exing could be adapted to accommodate credences, e.g. Gupta 2006. 
18 See, e.g. Fitelson et al. 2006: 606. 
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Setting credences aside for the moment, perception “justifies” belief, or “provides reasons” for 
belief, or (more plainly put) induces knowledge. Exactly how this works is controversial. On one 
view, if one exes p, one has “prima facie justification” for believing p, whether p is true or not.19 
On another view, exing is a determinable of a factive propositional attitude, which we can call 
sensing, which does all the epistemological heavy lifting. In the good case, when everything is 
working well, one senses (and exes) p; if one takes one’s experience at face value, then one ends 
up knowing p. In the illusory bad case, one merely exes p and the corresponding belief is 
excusable but unjustified. This is closer to McDowell’s account.20 In a variant, there is no step 
between sensing (or exing) p and believing p—experience is automatically “taken at face value”. 
On this view, exing (and so sensing) entails believing, and sensing (but not exing) entails 
knowing (Byrne 2016).21    
 When you see the tomato and soap, it is natural to think that vision testifies that the tomato is 
red and the soap is white, with no qualification needed. Vision is not testifying that the 
hypothesis that the soap is white is likely correct; neither is there anything palpably probabilistic 
in the attitude, the exing relation of ostensible perceptual awareness that you bear to the content. 
There is nothing hesitant or tentative in the presentation of the scene before your eyes: the 
tomato and soap are just there. 
 Here is McDowell saying much the same thing. Consider a good case of seeing a medium-
sized green object in daylight. One is in a position in which: 
the greenness of things is visibly there for one, present to one’s rationally self-conscious 
awareness…One’s perceptual state leaves no possibility that it is not green (McDowell 
2011: 38, last emphasis added). 
Now it is true that Bayesian models are very popular in perceptual psychology, and for good 
reason. Recovery of the layout of the environment from the retinal stimulus is a notoriously ill-
posed problem: many hypotheses are compatible with the data. A promising approach is to 
employ Bayesian methods. In a Bayesian perceptual model, the end result of the strictly 
Bayesian part is a posterior probability distribution over various possibilities—for instance, 
 
19 See, e.g., Pryor 2000, Huemer 2001, and Siegel and Silins 2015. 
20 See Byrne 2014. 
21 For related views, see Gluer 2009, Quilty-Dunn 2015, and Lewis 1980b: 239. 
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different orientations of lines, or different shapes. Leaving it there would plainly be inadequate: 
as an overview of such models explains, “Perception normally yields a determinate percept. For 
instance, one sees an object as having a determinate shape, not a spectrum of more or less 
probable shapes” (Rescorla 2015: 697). To accommodate the phenomenology, the Bayesian 
theorist adds a decision rule to determine one possibility as the “best” hypothesis. One such 
decision rule selects the environmental possibility that has the maximum posterior probability 
(the MAP, or Maximum A Posteriori Rule) (Mamassian et al. 2002; see also Bennett et al. 2014, 
Rescorla 2015). The proposition corresponding to the selected possibility is then the one that the 
subject exes.  
 As illustrated by the quotation at the beginning, bistable figures like the Necker cube (below) 
vividly show the need for a decision rule.  
 
The stimulus suggests two plausible real world hypotheses (ironically, neither is correct when 
viewing the usual 2D illustration). On both hypotheses a wire cube is before the perceiver, but 
the hypotheses disagree about its orientation. Any reasonable Bayesian prior will not favor one 
over the other. As Denison says, “If there is any situation in which we might expect perception to 
give us a probabilistic experience, it is when viewing a bistable figure…But this is not what 
happens” (2017: 67). Instead, we oscillate from seeing the Necker figure as a wire cube with one 
orientation, to seeing it with another.  
 Exing, then, is no more probabilistic than believing—even less so, if one can’t ex 
propositions about probabilities. It is thus quite ill-suited to interface with credences. If one exes 
p, what should one’s credence in p be, all else equal? If p is always a fact about some inner realm 
of self-disclosing sensations or appearances, credence 1 is arguably appropriate (and then 
updating could proceed in the usual manner, by ordinary conditionalization). But Cartesianism 
about perception has had its day, and on the contemporary and much better motivated view, p is 
a proposition about various aspects of one’s physical environment. Even in the good case, 
maximal certainty about the presence of tomatoes and soap is too dogmatic: if updating can only 
proceed by conditionalization (including Jeffrey conditionalization), it would never be rational to 
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change one’s mind.22 But any lower credence than 1 is entirely arbitrary. The rational response to 
an ordinary case of testimony (perhaps just knowledgeable testimony) is belief in the content of 
the testimony. On the standard picture of exing, the edges of our “web of belief”, where it 
“impinges on experience” (Quine 1951: 39), are not “degrees of belief” or credences—they are 
full beliefs.  
 As Munton insightfully puts it: 
It is natural to understand the contents of belief states and perceptual states as structurally 
analogous to each other. This is motivated in part by the way in which the two seem 
capable of interacting with each other. But if belief comes in degrees, while perceptual 
states stand in a binary relation to their contents, how do they interface with each other? 
What facts about an experience fix the credence a subject is entitled to have in its 
contents? …what determines the probability that visual evidence receives? How does that 
evidence take a graded form, if the experiential state itself is binary? There is a mismatch 
between the form of the visual state and that of the belief-state that responds to it. 
(Munton 2016: 310) 
If the propositional attitude distinctive of perceiving is exing, credences are not found at the 
edges of the web of belief. They must lie in the interior.  
 Granted that the web starts out with some “a priori” prior credences in the interior, how can 
credences rationally change? If perceptual experience doesn’t directly induce a rational change in 
credence, then the only other candidate is belief, or knowledge. For instance, knowledge that the 
coin has a probability of .5 of landing heads might rationally induce a credence of .5 that the coin 
will land heads (cf. the “Principal Principle” of Lewis 1980a: 26623). The relevant kind of 
probability could be “objective chance” as found in quantum mechanics, some other kind of 
 
22 Conditionalizing on p amounts to replacing one’s probability function POLD(a) with PNEW(a) = POLD(a|p); thus 
PNEW(p) = 1, and so one becomes 100% certain in p. Jeffrey conditionalizing on p, in the simplest case where one 
becomes x% confident in p and 1-x% confident in ~p, amounts to replacing POLD(a) with PNEW(a) = POLD(a|p).x% +  
POLD(a|~p).1-x%. In both cases if POLD (q) = 1 then PNEW (q) = 1. (See Jeffrey 1965: ch. 11.) 
23 As Lewis formulates the Principal Principle, it is not stated in terms of knowledge (or belief) at all, but rather 
credence. Roughly: given that you have credence 1 that the objective chance of p is x, your credence in p should also 
be x. 
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physical probability, or probability relative to evidence (evidential probability). Knowledge of 
the symmetry of the coin, the tossing process, or the frequency of previous tosses, may have a 
similar effect without passing through explicit knowledge of probabilities. Thus, a dynamic 
system of credences may be restored by supposing that exing produces knowledge right at the 
perception-cognition interface, which in turn is leveraged to produce more knowledge, which at 
some point induces rational credences.24 
Dogramaci has recently defended a proposal along these lines: 
you have a rational credence, n, in a proposition p—if and only if, and because—you 
reasoned that the chance25 of p is n, and your reasoning followed the correct rules for 
reasoning about chances. (2018: 11) 
Dogramaci’s proposal is far from the usual Bayesian vision: knowledge and belief are in the 
driving seat, with credences coming along for the ride. This is more of a vindication of 
traditional epistemology than anything else.  
 Worse, on this kind of proposal credences seem otiose. Either credences change in response 
to explicit knowledge of probabilities or else from knowledge that itself can easily yield 
knowledge of probabilities. So why bother with credences at all? Why not reason directly about 
probabilities? Indeed, Dogramaci himself is “inclined to accept” the view that “credences just 
are ordinary full beliefs with probabilistic contents” (10). (In the more standard terminology 
adopted in this paper, this is the view that there are no credences.) 
 The upshot is that credences are dubious entities if perception is not probabilistic. Munton, 
however, raises this problem for the Bayesian only to propose a solution. Along with Morrison 
(2016), she argues that perception is probabilistic after all. Can Munton and Morrison pull the 
Bayesian’s chestnuts out of the fire? The next section examines that question.26 
 
24 Cf. Williamson 2010: 4-7. 
25 “When I talk of chance here, I mean a specific sense of this ambiguous term, one that has been called evidential 
or epistemic probability” (Dogramaci 2018: 10). 
26 For more discussion of Morrison and Munton see Block 2018 (Morrison), Beck 2020 and Siegel 2020 (Morrison 
and Munton).  
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5:  Is perception probabilistic? 
Morrison and Munton’s views are similar; it will be convenient to start with Morrison. He 
defends PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE, “the view that our perceptual experiences assign degrees of 
confidence” (2016: 15), where “degrees of confidence”, at least in the “ideal” case, can be 
formally represented as obeying the probability calculus (21).27 After noting that philosophers of 
perception “became convinced that experiences are belief-like in many ways”, he says that 
“[a]ccording to PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE, experiences are belief-like in yet another way: they 
can assign more or less confidence” (16).  
 Now here Morrison is following many other philosophers and casually talking of beliefs 
when in all strictness he means credences. (At one point he mentions a “ten percent” “confidence 
at the level of belief” (15), clearly having credence .1 in mind.) If PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE is 
correct, then experiences are more credence-like than belief-like. As Munton puts the view, 
“visual states include something like the perceptual analogue of credence” (2016: 316).28 And 
that is exactly what we want. If exing is graded like credence, then perceptual input has a 
probabilistic structure. The web of belief is really a web of credence, at least at the edges. Beliefs 
must lie further from the periphery.  
 The previous section suggested that perception simply presents the world—the red tomato 
next to the white soap, for instance. However, philosophers are notoriously fond of restricted 
diets of examples, and the philosophy of perception is no exception. Staring glassily at some 
nearby medium-sized objects is a rather unusual kind of perceptual situation. More often we are 
actively scanning a scene to try to identify something—one’s keys, a familiar face in a crowd. 
And of course mundane actions are governed by perception—a glimpse of a patch of ice, or 
uneven pavement, prompts a step to the side. Often these sorts of cases are freighted with 
uncertainty—probably that is Titania (although it could be Oberon), probably the pavement is 
uneven (although there could be a misleading shadow), and so on.  
 Uncontroversially, sometimes uncertainty is on the side of cognition, rather than perception. 
Gazing at the tomato and the soap, and wondering how they got there, I suspect that Titania 
 
27 Morrison’s considered view is actually more qualified—see below. 
28 The full quotation from Munton is: “…perceptual analogue of credence for belief” (emphasis added), which 
elides the crucial difference between credence and belief. 
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came home early: ‘Perhaps she came home early’, I might say. But there is no temptation to 
think that perception is testifying that Titania came home early, hesitantly or not; neither is 
perception testifying that there’s a decent chance that Titania came home early. Rather, 
perception tells me something about the tomato and the soap, and it is this strictly perceptual 
evidence that supports my suspicion that Titania came home early. All “perceptual” uncertainty 
might be like that—a view that Morrison labels POST-PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE.29 
 According to PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE, uncertainty is also sometimes on the side of 
perception; specifically, a kind of uncertainty that is analogous to credences. That is, probability 
is not in the content of perception, but rather in the attitude. Just as a hardcore Bayesian like 
Jeffrey replaces ‘believing p’ with ‘having credence x in p’, the proponent of PERCEPTUAL 
CONFIDENCE replaces ‘exing p’ with ‘exing p to degree x’—exingx p, for short. Morrison and 
Munton provide a number of motivating examples. Here are two representative ones. 
Vision in fog: Elmer looks through a window and sees a tree being slowly enveloped by fog; “as 
the fog becomes thicker,…the degree of justification Elmer’s experience provides for a tree 
belief [e.g., that there is a tree outside] begins to wane” (Munton 2016: 304). 
Peripheral vision: fixating on a cross, with five closely spaced vertical black bars displaced some 
distance to the right, “It looks as though there could be three bars, four bars, five bars, six bars, 
seven bars, or eight bars, but most likely five or six bars” (Morrison 2016: 18). 
The second example shows that uncertainty even attends the tomato and soap example. Visual 
acuity drops off quite dramatically outside foveal vision, a fact not immediately apparent because 
our eyes are typically jittering from one point to another. But if you try to read the inscription 
Ivory on the soap while fixating on the tomato, it will be obvious.  
 Now one could take these examples to support what we can call PERCEPTUAL PROBABILITY: the 
content of perception is, at least sometimes, probabilistic. Munton does not pursue this 
possibility (2016: 316); Morrison, on the other hand, expresses some sympathy with it. (In fact, 
Morrison understands PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE as a broad thesis that has PERCEPTUAL 
 
29 In the psychological literature ‘visual confidence’ is used for “an observer’s ability to judge the accuracy of her 
perceptual decisions” (Mamassian 2016: 459)—metacognitive “post-perceptual” confidence, not a view like 
Morrison and Munton’s.  
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PROBABILITY as a special case. But for our purposes it is better to take PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE 
as the narrow thesis that exing should be replaced by exingx.) 
 PERCEPTUAL PROBABILITY does not force a credence-based epistemology. If perception is 
testifying that an object is “likely to be a tree” (Munton 2016: 316), then since that could 
rationally induce a probabilistic belief with the same content, why is there any need for 
credences? On the other hand, PERCEPTUAL PROBABILITY is not uncongenial to credence-based 
epistemology. There may be advantages to using credences rather than beliefs, and PERCEPTUAL 
PROBABILITY allows that they too could be rationally induced at the web’s edges.  
 PERCEPTUAL PROBABILITY cannot be ignored, then. We can use Munton’s fog example as the 
main proving ground for both PERCEPTUAL PROBABILITY and PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE. 
Elaborating on the example, Munton writes: 
If [Elmer] goes to the window soon, he will be able to see the tree outside clearly. That 
experience entitles him to have a high credence in the proposition that there’s a tree 
outside. If he waits a little longer, his foggier experience will entitle him to have only a 
moderate credence in that same content. Why? Both experiences have tree content. But 
that content is presented with different degrees of confidence. When it is presented with a 
high degree of confidence, that entitles Elmer to have a correspondingly high credence in 
the corresponding proposition. When it is presented with a moderate confidence, that 
entitles him to have the same middling degree of belief in its contents. (2016: 322) 
Let pTREE be the proposition that this (the tree outside Elmer’s window) is a tree. Munton 
describes Elmer’s situation in accord with PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE: picking some numbers for 
illustration, if Elmer looks out of the window early, he will ex.9 pTREE; and if he looks out of the 
window late, he will ex.6 pTREE. (We can ignore qualifications about time and tense.) On the 
alternative view, PERCEPTUAL PROBABILITY, the propositions that Elmer exes will be about 
probability, specifically the probability of pTREE. If Elmer looks out of the window early, then his 
experience will testify that the probability of pTREE is .9. 
 Take PERCEPTUAL PROBABILITY first. What kind of probability could experience be testifying 
to? One possibility Morrison mentions is subjective confidence. On that view:  
your experience is like a weatherman who tells you how much subjective probability he 
assigns to the possibility that it will rain tomorrow. (2017: 75)    
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One proposition that Elmer exes when he looks out of the window early, then, can be more 
explicitly expressed as: this experience is confident to degree .9 in pTREE (cf. Morrison 2016: 38). 
 This is not a very appealing view, if only for the reason that it loses the idea of a perceptual 
presentation as of a tree entirely. This object is not presented as a tree, or even as likely to be a 
tree. Rather, it is presented as something this experience is 90% confident is a tree. Like 
Morrison’s weatherman, perceptual experience is simply telling Elmer about itself, specifically 
about its own degrees of confidence. Not only is the content of Elmer’s perceptual state 
compatible with this object not being a tree, it is also compatible with this object being not at all 
likely to be a tree.30 
 The other possibility is that the relevant probability is “objective”—a physical probability of 
some kind, or (more plausibly) an evidential one. And this is more attractive: perceptual 
experience is not entirely self-absorbed, and the object is presented as (likely to be) a tree.  
 If Elmer looks out the window early, and watches the tree as the fog slowly gathers, his 
visual system first testifies that prob(pTREE)=.9, and continues to revise this number downwards. 
Now imagine a different case: Elmer is watching a tree shrinking in size (on a clear day). Elmer’s 
visual system first testifies that the height of the tree=h, and continues to revise this number 
downwards. If the tree is shrinking sufficiently quickly, Elmer’s visual system will be able to 
detect the change, and Elmer will have the visual impression that the tree is changing—
specifically, that it is becoming smaller. Similarly, if the probability that that is a tree is changing 
sufficiently quickly, Elmer’s visual system will be able to detect the change, and Elmer will have 
the visual impression that the tree is changing: specifically, that it is becoming less likely to be a 
tree. But that is not how a tree being rapidly swathed in fog looks: the only apparent change in 
the scene is the increasing fog. 
 Putting confidence or probability in the content is not particularly promising, then. That 
leaves PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE, on which the perceptual propositional attitude is the credence-
like attitude of exingx. 
 
30 Morrison mentions the similarity of his proposal to Searle’s, on which the content of Elmer’s perceptual state is: 
there is a tree there which is causing this visual experience (cf. Searle 1983: 48-9). But Searle’s view at least has the 
advantage that it does not eliminate the perceptual presentation as of a tree. This problem applies to two other 
suggestions of Morrison’s, that your experience is “telling you how much confidence you should have”, or is 
ordering you to have a certain confidence level (“Assign fifty percent confidence!”) (2016: 38).  
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 Return again to Elmer, looking at the befogged tree. He may ex various propositions, 
including pTREE, but his experience is not fragmented, waiting for cognition to combine it into 
one detailed story about scene before his eyes. He plausibly exes a proposition that specifies the 
scene in much more detail than any tractable linguistic representation of it, and that entails any 
other proposition that he exes. Let that proposition, the total content of Elmer’s experience at 
that time, be pMAX; pMAX entails pTREE. If PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE is right, Elmer exes pMAX to a 
certain degree, say .7. Presumably that proposition could be exed to a different degree, say .9. 
There should be a pair of cases, then, where one subject exes pMAX to degree .7 and the other 
exes pMAX to degree .9. And the difficulty is that there seem to be no such cases. Given the total 
content, there is no wiggle room for the hypothesized perceptual confidence in this proposition to 
vary. 
 Let us examine this objection in more detail. As Morrison notes, if the motivating examples 
support PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE, they also “support CONFIDENTIALISM, the view that if two 
experiences have the same phenomenology, they assign confidence in the same way” (2016: 21), 
and along similar lines Munton says that “[d]ifferences in confidence are phenomenally 
detectable” (2016: 317). A widely held (albeit disputed) thesis is INTENTIONALISM, the view that 
(necessarily) if two experiences have the same content, the experiences have the same 
phenomenal character (Harman 1990 is an early classic defense31). PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE, 
CONFIDENTIALISM, and INTENTIONALISM are jointly inconsistent. By PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE, 
the perceiving propositional attitude is exingx. By INTENTIONALISM, exingx p and exingy p have 
the same phenomenal character, even if x≠y, which implies that CONFIDENTIALISM is false. 
 It is not enough to reject INTENTIONALISM. Imagine seeing a red spot in good light: your 
visual system can detect both the color of the spot and the intensity of the illuminant, among 
other things. For simplicity, pretend that the total content of your experience is the proposition 
that that the spot is red and brightly illuminated. Your experience has a distinctive “phenomenal 
character” (PCR), quite different from the phenomenal character associated with seeing a green 
spot (PCG). Perhaps some kind of “inverted spectrum” scenario shows that someone could ex 
that the spot is red and brightly illuminated, just as you do, but with the accompanying 
phenomenal character being PCG (Block 2003). If that is right then INTENTIONALISM is false. But 
 
31 See also Tye 2000, Chalmers 2004, and Speaks 2015. 
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in order to defend PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE, we need to argue that the exed proposition—that 
the spot is red and brightly illuminated—can be (in Munton’s phrase) “presented with different 
degrees of confidence”. And it is quite unclear how to do that. Cases of seeing the spot under dim 
light are irrelevant, since that is to change the content.32 
 The upshot is that the total content of experience does not appear to be something that can be 
exed to differing degrees. In fact, there seems little reason to suppose that the total content is 
exed to any degree at all. The propositions that Morrison and Munton isolate as “assigned 
degrees of confidence” are never the total contents of the relevant experiences. 
 Couldn’t the traditional attitude of exing and the new-fangled attitude of exingx be 
combined? When p is the total content, one exes p. But for various weaker propositions q (that 
this is a tree, for instance), one may exx q. The problem with this suggestion is that the senses 
come out as incoherent: they testify to p without qualification, but also hesitantly testify to some 
propositions entailed by p. Taking one’s experience “at face value” would then require full belief 
in p and, say, .5 credence in q—not a rational combination by anyone’s lights. 
 Finally, a second objection. Elmer, suppose, has different “amounts of confidence” in 
propositions, represented by a function CfELMER from propositions to the interval [0, 1]. 
Assuming Elmer is a mere mortal, CfELMER not a probability function: perhaps CfELMER(p) = .7, 
but CfELMER(~p) is undefined, or is set at .4. So why is CfELMER a credence function? In other 
words, why are Elmer’s states of confidence credences, as opposed to graded but non-
probabilistic mental states? Because Elmer’s states of confidence aim at probabilities, in the 
sense that there something defective about them if CfELMER isn’t a probability function. Elmer’s 
amount of confidence in p and his amount of confidence in ~p should sum to 1: his confidence 
function Cf should be like the credence function Cr of an ideally rational agent. Without this 
normative story, there is no reason to think that ‘x’ in ‘is confident in p to degree x’ stands for a 
probability at all.  
 Likewise for ‘exing p to degree x’: a normative story is required if “degrees of perceptual 
confidence” are going to be probabilities, and so are suitable to interface with credences. That is, 
we need to establish that, “like degree of doxastic confidence, degrees of [perceptual confidence] 
 
32 The original case is Jeffrey’s “observation by candlelight” (1965: 165-6), mentioned by both Morrison and 
Munton.  
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are more or less ideal to the extent they preserve the axioms of probability theory” (Morrison 
2016: 34). But is that plausible? 
 Block has remarked on the apparent “lack of logical structure” in perception, vision in 
particular (Block 2019: 507).33 Put in terms of exing, Block’s point is that if p is a proposition 
that can be exed, then ~p isn’t; similarly, if exing can predicate feature F, then it can’t predicate 
~F.34 That seems right: returning to the tomato and soap, vision presents the tomato as red, but 
does not present the soap as not-red—rather, it simply presents the soap as white. (Red is a 
feature that can produce perceptual “pop-out”; not-red is not.) A similar point goes for Morrison 
and Munton’s examples. To the extent that it is plausible to think of vision as presenting 
incompatible alternatives, these do not include p and ~p, or an object’s either having F or ~F. As 
Morrison describes his example of peripheral vision, “there could be three bars, four bars, five 
bars…”.35 Block attributes the lack of negation to the representational format of perception 
(which Block thinks is iconic), but we need not investigate this further. It is sufficient to note that 
the absence of negation is not credibly a deficit, something corrected by an “ideal” visual system 
to which primate visual systems aspire. Yet without the claim that an ideal visual system would 
constrain the perceiver to ex1-x ~p if she exesx p, “visual confidences” are not probabilities. And 
if they are not probabilities, we are back to Munton’s “mismatch between the form of the visual 
state” and the probabilistic credences that allegedly respond to it.  
6:  Against credences 
The (provisional) conclusion is that perception is not probabilistic: both PERCEPTUAL 
PROBABILITY and PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE are false. If there are credences, their point of entry 
is cognitive, not perceptual. But a cognitive point of entry threatens to render credences 
redundant. The easiest way out is to deny that we have credences, but this option is frequently 
not considered. This last section takes it seriously.  
 
33 See also Pautz 2020. 
34 Disjunction is another example; Block himself doesn’t think perception has propositional content (2019: 507). 
35 Morrison suggests that “In simple cases, our experiences assign confidence to a possibility and its negation, like 
that [a person in the distance is] Isaac and that it’s not Isaac” (2016: 20); but by the usual tests not being Isaac is not 
a feature that figures in perceptual content.   
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 One—perhaps the main—reason why belief-monism is usually off the table is that credence 
is taken to be “an intuitive notion in folk psychology, familiar from everyday speech and 
thought” (Eriksson and Hájek 2007: 20936). Elaborating, Eriksson and Hájek write: 
After all, we have various ways in English (and, we hazard to guess, every natural 
language) for conveying our degrees of belief. Think of the spectrum of phrases that we 
have at our disposal: “I’m certain that p”, “I’m almost certain that p”, “I’m extremely 
confident that p”, “I’m moderately confident that p”, “I’m fairly confident that p”, ... all 
the way down to their duals at the other end: “I’m certain that not-p”, and so on. 
(Eriksson and Hájek 2007: 209) 
However, this list of phrases is not exactly the promised “spectrum” from ‘I’m certain that p’ to 
‘I’m certain that not-p’. First, the phrases are very limited in number. Second, and more 
significantly, confidence vanishes around Eriksson and Hájek’s ellipsis, which is why ‘I’m 
certain that’ reappears at the other end. A poll asked Americans how confident they were that the 
Mueller investigation into President Trump’s ties to Russia were fair and impartial. They were 
given three possible responses: “extremely/very”, “moderately”, and “not very/not at all”.37 
Someone who thought that it was pretty much a tossup—that the investigation was about as 
likely to be partial as to be impartial—should choose the last option, not the second one. To be 
“moderately confident” (or, indeed, “fairly confident”) that the investigation was impartial is, if 
not actually to believe that it is impartial, then to be teetering on the edge.38 One should be not at 
all confident that a fair coin will land heads; likewise, one should be not at all confident that it 
will land tails (cf. Wright and Ayton 1994: 4). As Williamson puts it, “‘No confidence’ is quite 
different from ‘no chance’” (Williamson forthcoming). Only by appeal to the charity of the 
hearer can one force ‘no confidence’ to be ‘no chance’. The question ‘How confident are you on 
a scale of 0% to 100% that this coin will land heads?’ is best interpreted as asking for an estimate 
of probability: thus, if the coin is fair, ‘50% confident’ is the right answer. 
 What about the extremes? Doesn’t “everyday speech and thought” at least give us a handle 
on credence 1 and credence zero? We do say, after all, that we are extremely/completely/very 
 
36 See also Christensen 2004, Sturgeon 2015, Pettigrew 2016, and Leitgeb 2017, among others. 
37 The poll was by the Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, March 2019. 
38 It’s also worth noting that ‘I am moderately confident that…’ is quite a rare construction. 
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confident in various propositions. Kellyanne Conway, counsellor to President Trump, once told 
reporters that “I’m very confident he’s not breaking any laws”. Even if she had sincerely said 
she was “100% confident”, it is safe to say that she would not have bet her life for a dollar on the 
proposition that Trump is no law breaker. If betting behavior is good test of credence, then 
Conway did not have credence 1 in that proposition. By the betting test, no ordinary person has 
credence 1 in anything; if it occurs at all, credence 1 appears to be a sign of insanity rather than 
the ideal of rationality.    
 Do comparative judgments point towards credences? According to Staffel, “degrees of belief 
are the kinds of attitudes we mean when we [say]…that S is more confident in p than in q” 
(Staffel 2013: 3536-7). To take a morbid example from John Venn, “Do I not feel more certain 
that some one will die this week in the whole town, than in the particular street in which I live?” 
(Venn 1888: 149). The at-least-as-confident-in-x-than-y relation at best only generates a partial 
order over propositions, since for many pairs of propositions p, q (including some I have 
entertained), I will not be at least as confident in p than I am in q, and neither be at least as 
confident in q than I am in p. (For example, take p to be the proposition that there is life 
elsewhere in our galaxy, and q to be the proposition that my young son will be an accountant.) 
And although one can make sense of numerically qualified comparisons, like ‘I am twice as 
confident in p that I am in q’, the natural interpretive strategy is to understand these unusual 
locutions as covert probability talk: ‘I think p is twice as likely to be true than q’. (More typical 
numerically qualified uses of ‘confidence’ are used to speak about self-assurance, not credence: 
‘I am twice as confident as I used to be’.) Ordinary comparative judgments of confidence by 
themselves do not give us anything like the rich structure of a probability space.39 
 Credences are not worn on the sleeve of our talk about confidence. They may yet be 
implicated in some unobvious way, as a number of sophisticated semantic proposals have it (e.g. 
Yalcin 2012). But to use the virtues of these proposals to argue for credences is to put the 
semantic cart before the psychological horse. An independent case for credences needs to be 
given first. 
 
39 Given certain assumptions, a comparative probability relation can be represented by a (non-unique) probability 
function; see Stefánsson 2017. Stefánsson uses this formal result to argue that only comparative credences are 
psychologically real (see Stefánsson 2018 for some qualifications). This position is also vulnerable to the main 
arguments in this paper. 
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 Perhaps credences are evident by the light of introspection? (Introspection is understood here 
as a method of knowing about one’s own mental states that has no application to the mental 
states of others.40) Indeed, it is invariably assumed that one has at least some knowledge of one’s 
credences, presumably by a first-person method.41  
 One can easily learn to speak the lingo of credences, and to report one’s ostensible degrees of 
confidence in various propositions. That might seem to be evidence for credences—why else 
would the reporting come so easily? However, there are plausible alternative explanations that 
render the postulation of credences idle. One is given a simple coin-tossing problem. What is 
one’s credence that the coin will land heads twice? The only apparent way to answer is to 
calculate the probability that the coin will land heads twice. Once one has worked that out 
(rightly or wrongly), the probability simply gets transferred to one’s supposed credence: ‘I have 
credence .25 that the coin will land heads’. And a mere recipe for converting known statements 
about Xs to corresponding statements about Ys does not suggest that the latter are true, otherwise 
astrology would be on a much surer footing. 
 Another kind of case where probability judgments seem to be in the driving seat are non-
numerical comparisons like Venn’s example: “Do I not feel more certain that some one will die 
this week in the whole town, than in the particular street in which I live?” There is no need to 
suppose that an affirmative answer is given by comparing one’s credences in the two 
propositions: one can simply note that deaths in Venn’s street are deaths in his town, but not 
conversely. So (given a background assumption about mortality) deaths in his town must be 
more probable than deaths in his street, which one can express in terms of “feeling more certain”. 
Alternatively, as in the fable of Linda the feminist bank teller, one might answer by using 
Kahneman and Tversky’s representative heuristic. A representative bank teller is not, like Linda, 
a philosophy major passionate about social justice; hence Linda is more likely to be a feminist 
bank teller than a bank teller—which again one can express in terms of feeling more certain. If 
one is familiar with the ideology of credences, one can further report that one has greater 
credence that Linda is a feminist bank teller, but we have not yet seen any reason to think that 
this report is correct.    
 
40 On introspection of credences, see Dogramaci 2016; on introspection of the strength of belief, see Byrne 2018: 
119-20. 
41 Or, if not knowledge, then a Bayesian surrogate. 
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 One can answer Venn’s question without being able to discern one’s credence in either 
proposition. If we have direct introspective access to credences, an explanation is needed of how 
one can compare them without having the foggiest idea of their actual values. That is not to say 
that one can’t be provided, but the most parsimonious hypothesis is that answering Venn’s 
question does not involve comparing credences at all. 
 So far we have gone some way to undermining the positive case for credences; let us now 
consider the positive case against. 
6.1 The difficulty of probabilistic reasoning 
In 2012 97 members of the UK Parliament were asked for the probability of getting heads twice 
in two coin tosses. 60 gave the wrong answer (Spiegelhalter 2019: 209). Admittedly they were 
not told that the coin could land either heads or tails with equal probability, or that the 
probability of a second head given a first head is the same as the probability of a second head 
given a first tail, but this would only have confused them further. 
 It is not just MPs. People in general are not very good at reasoning with explicitly 
probabilistic premises (say, the probability of positive test result given cancer = .8); we do much 
better if presented with natural frequencies (of 10 people with a positive test result, 8 will have 
cancer). Given data in the form of conditional probabilities, we find it difficult to work out, say, 
the probability that a person has cancer given a positive test result. Given similar data in the form 
of natural frequencies, the problem is much more tractable.42 Holton uses this fact to argue 
against credences: 
[I]f the probabilities were really in the attitudes [as opposed to being in the content], then 
to do the calculation the subjects would need to have credences of the correct degree 
before they could apply Bayes’ rule. But the relevant degrees of credence are exactly 
what they are given when the problems are presented as conditional probabilities. In 
contrast, in the natural frequency presentation, the conditional probabilities are merely 
implicit in the data. The subjects would first have to calculate the relevant conditional 
probabilities and then go on to apply Bayes’ rule. So you would expect the natural 
 
42 Simplifying Holton’s example (2014: 22): 10 in 1000 people have cancer; of those 10, 8 will have a positive test 
result. Of the remaining 990, 99 will have a positive test result. Assuming these frequencies reflect the probabilities, 
the probability of cancer conditional on a positive test = 8/107 = 7%. 
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frequency presentation, requiring a further step, to be more difficult than the conditional 
probability presentation. (Holton 2014: 24)43 
Holton is assuming that if we have credences, they are used to reason with probabilities. That is, 
if one has a probabilistic problem to solve (‘What is the probability that someone with a positive 
test result has cancer?’) one first forms the appropriate credences, given the description of the 
problem. Next, one’s Bayesian psychological machinery starts whirring and grinding, and one 
forms a new credence—more exactly, a conditional credence, one’s credence in a person having 
cancer, conditional on having a positive test result. One then, in effect, converts this conditional 
credence into a belief about conditional probability, and the content of that belief is the answer: 
‘The probability that someone with a positive test result has cancer = 10%’. Explicitly stating the 
conditional probabilities, rather than leaving them implicit in the natural frequencies, would then 
presumably make the problem easier. 
 However, Holton’s argument does not quite work as stated. As Holton himself emphasizes, 
putting the problem in terms of natural frequencies makes it easy to solve through a simple 
calculation. Given that a simple calculation is available, why take the trouble of converting 
frequencies to probabilities, then to credences, and back again to probabilities? And if subjects 
stick with the simple calculation, then the natural frequency presentation does not involve a 
“further step”—the method is entirely different. So there is no reason to expect it to be more 
difficult.   
 Still, that does not explain why we do so badly with the conditional probability presentation. 
We clearly do not form the appropriate credences and let the Bayesian machinery do its work: 
the vast majority of us become confused and give the wrong answer. And there is no evidence 
that the unconfused minority are manipulating credences, rather than explicitly reasoning with 
beliefs about probabilities. 
 This is puzzling. If we have credences, then there must be at least a rough match between 
them and our statements of probability and confidence. For if these come drastically apart, and 
credences explain behavior, then one would predict peculiar dissociations—I claim to feel very 
 
43 Holton has another argument, which starts from the premise that the two presentations are “logically equivalent” 
“descriptions of the same situation” (25). But the two presentations are not logically equivalent, since natural 
frequencies are compatible with numerous different assignments of probability. 
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confident that Zippy will win the 2.30, but put all my money on The Sluggard. Given that we 
have both beliefs and credences, one would expect the credences to provide some added value, 
otherwise they would be an evolutionary extravagance.  
 Perhaps the fact that the problem is stated linguistically somehow biases us to reason with 
beliefs about probabilities rather than credences. So let us leave language behind altogether, and 
examine how chimpanzees, our closest relatives, cope with elementary probability problems. 
Chimpanzees are similar to us in so many ways: they have the same basic perceptual apparatus; 
they know about the mental lives of their fellows and have complex social relations; they can 
count, anticipate the future, and reason using disjunctive syllogism. It would be extraordinary if 
credences arose in the human lineage, leaving chimpanzees to muddle through with old-
fashioned belief and knowledge. Credences are of no more help with distinctively human 
problems than they are with problems faced by all great apes. If we have credences, chimpanzees 
surely do as well. 
 Here is one relevant experiment (Hanus and Call 2014).44 A chimpanzee watches treats being 
put into closed cans, resulting in (say) two of six cans on the right, and one of two cans on the 
left, containing a treat. The chimpanzee does not know which individual cans have treats, and 
has the option of picking one can from the right or one can from the left. Choosing left will 
maximize the expected gain: 50% chance of a treat as opposed to 33%. Chimpanzees do better 
than chance, and seem to be sensitive to the ratio of the two probabilities—the higher it is, the 
more likely they are to make the right choice. Interestingly, they show no appreciation of the 
significance of probability 1, treating the certainty of a treat on one side like any other 
probability, to be compared to the probability of a treat on the other. If chimpanzees have 
credences, one would expect the advantages of the Bayesian machinery to be on display here. 
Instead, the chimpanzees’ performance suggests that they are merely capable of rudimentary 
probability judgments.  
 Chimpanzees, like many other animals, have a variety of ways of coping with uncertainty. 
For example, they can monitor how well they have performed on a rewarded task where the 
reward is dispensed some distance away. The chimpanzees can either wait for a cue that tells 
them they will be rewarded, or else move to the reward site before the cue (making it easier to 
 
44 See also Tecwyn et al. 2017. On probabilistic reasoning in infants, see Denison and Xu 2014. 
   
 
25 
get the reward). They are more likely to move early when they successfully complete the task 
(Beran et al. 2015). But this sophisticated ability does not require credences.45 
6.2 Credences and memory 
On the Bayesian picture, credences are supposed to be retained, just like beliefs, and updated 
when necessary. Without retention, there would be no learning (more precisely, no Bayesian 
surrogate of learning). And if credences are retained, they can surely be recalled, brought to mind 
when the occasion requires. What would recalling a credence be like? If one has credence x in p 
one can note that psychological fact and commit it to memory, later recollecting that one has 
credence x in p. However, this is ordinary belief-memory, not credence-memory in the pertinent 
sense. If one can bring to mind one’s stored credence x in p, the content of this episode of 
recollection should be p, the content of the credence. How could the probabilistic index x 
manifest itself? The obvious suggestion is: through a feeling of confidence. That is, one will 
recall p, but one’s recollection will more or less confident, depending on the value of x. 
 Sometimes confidence is an entirely intellectual affair, as with Venn’s example of being 
more certain of a death next week in one’s town than a death in one’s street. Venn uses ‘feel 
more certain’ which, although perfectly appropriate, blurs the distinction between his example 
and ones where there really is some kind of “feeling” or sensation. (“Feeling confident in p” is 
therefore improbably a natural psychological kind.) The classic illustrations of 
phenomenological confidence are “tip of the tongue” states, poetically described by William 
James: 
Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. 
There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of 
wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments 
tingle with the sense of our closeness and then letting it sink back without the longed-for 
term. (James 1893: 251) 
Consider an example discussed by Weisberg (2020). If asked for the capital of Iceland, one 
might answer ‘Reykjavik’, but in some palpable way “feel uncertain” that the answer is correct. 
(And similarly for comparatives: one might palpably “feel more certain” that Reykjavik is the 
 
45 On “uncertainty monitoring” in animals, see Smith et al. 2003, Smith and Washburn 2005. 
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capital than that Bergen is.) And this seems to be exactly the desired phenomenon: if there is 
such a thing as recalling a credence, this is an example. Weisberg sees a problem here, noting 
that there is much evidence suggesting that these sorts of “feelings of confidence” (or “feelings 
of knowing”) are due to cues like ease of processing (“fluency”) and whether related information 
can be brought to mind.46 As he puts it, “confidence in memory-based beliefs appears to be 
constructed at the time of recall, rather than stored” (18). Weisberg directly draws the conclusion 
that credence is “constructed at the time of recall” (19), but this seems to be because he identifies 
credence and confidence (in the ordinary sense47).  
 However, confidence—whether of the intellectual or phenomenological variety—is not 
credence. The fact that feelings of confidence derive from the process of recollection does not 
immediately show that credences are not stored in memory. But we can reach that conclusion by 
slightly expanding and amending Weisberg’s line of thought. If we can recall credences, their 
strength is manifest (at least sometimes) in feelings of confidence. Feelings of confidence are 
based on cues like fluency. Yet it is very implausible that fluency and related cues are an 
indication of the strength of remembered credence. A storage system for credences needs to keep 
track of two items, propositions and their probabilistic indices. There is no reason to think that 
retrieving <p, .5> is going to be harder than retrieving <p, .9>. And what on earth would be the 
point of making middling or low credences a struggle to retrieve?  
 If we can store credences, we should be able to recollect them. Since the best candidate for 
doing that is not sensitive to the strength of credence, but is rather driven by unrelated factors, 
credences are not remembered. 
* * * 
Orthodoxy about credences and orthodoxy about perception conflict. Attempts to resolve the 
conflict by amending orthodoxy about perception instructively fail. This paper has recommended 
heterodoxy about credences instead. As Weisberg emphasizes, the empirical issues are subtle and 
 
46 See, e.g., Oppenheimer 2008. 
47 E.g., “how do dualists explain the tight connection between full belief and high credence? Typically, we believe P 
only when we are highly confident in P” (Weisberg 2020: 3, emphasis added). 
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48 Many thanks to Jake Beck, Tyler Brooke-Wilson, Andy Egan, E.J. Green, Steven Gross, Anil Gupta, Alan Hájek, 
Richard Holton, Harvey Lederman, John Morrison, Jessie Munton, Ram Neta, Susanna Schellenberg, Miriam 
Schoenfield, Susanna Siegel, Kieran Setiya, Jonna Vance, Roger White, and audiences at MIT, Cambridge, and the 
2019 Rutgers Epistemology Conference. 
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